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Rape, Sexual Slavery, and Forced Marriage at the 
International Criminal Court: How Katanga 
Utilizes a Ten-Year-Old Rule but Overlooks New 
Jurisprudence 
Elena Gekker* 
“My body was affected.  My God, I was very ashamed.  Now I have 
become useless.  That is something that I do not believe anyone could be 
subjected to in life, that is to totally destroy someone’s body.  You become 
totally useless.  You no longer have any value.  When somebody sees you, 
they do not value you any longer, and they look down on you.” [Testimony 
of Witness 1321] 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On February 24, 2003, the village of Bogoro in the Ituri province of 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was startled awake by heavy 
gunfire.2  The Nationalist and Integrationist Front (FNI) and the Front for 
Patriotic Resistance of Ituri (FRPI) soldiers were attacking the Union of 
Congolese Patriots (UPC) militia in control of the Hema-dominated 
village.3  The attack was aimed at driving the UPC from Bogoro, a 
strategically important town between Bunia, the district capital, and the 
border with Uganda.4  FNI and FRPI soldiers, often children under the age 
 
* Editor-in-Chief, 2013-2014; J.D. Candidate, 2014, University of California, Hastings 
College of the Law; B.A., Political Science and History, Notre Dame de Namur University, 
2011.  I would like to thank Professor Susana SáCouto and the Summer Law Program in 
The Hague at American University, Washington College of Law for introducing me first-
hand to this difficult but fascinating topic and Professor Naomi Roht-Arriaza at UC 
Hastings for her invaluable guidance throughout the writing process.  A special thank you to 
my family, friends, and Steve Spagnuolo for their continued and unconditional support.  
 1. Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, Gender Report Card on International 
Criminal Court 2010, 175 (Nov. 2010) http://www.iccwomen.org/news/docs/GRC10-WEB-
11-10-v4_Final-version-Dec.pdf [hereinafter Gender Report Card 2010]. 
 2. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07, Transcript of Record, 21 (Apr. 19, 2010), ICC-01/04-01/07-T-129-Red-ENG; Gender 
Report Card 2010, supra note 1, at 160.  
 3. Gender Report Card 2010, supra note 1, at 160.  
 4. U.N. Secretary-General, Special Report on the Events in Ituri, January 2002-
December 2003, ¶ 64, U.N. Doc. S/2004/573 (July 16, 2004) available at http://allafrica. 
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of fifteen, circled the village, armed with machetes, spears, arrows, rocket-
propelled grenades, rocket launchers and semiautomatic weapons.5 At least 
200 civilians were killed in a matter of hours, and the village looted, while 
survivors were imprisoned in rooms filled with corpses, and women and 
girls were gang-raped, mutilated, and sexually enslaved.6  The United 
Nations (U.N.) estimated that 173 of the over 200 victims were under the 
age of eighteen.7  Two men are alleged to have stood at the helm of this 
massacre—Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui,8 respective 
leaders of the FRPI and FNI.9 
What sets this incident apart from other similar atrocities committed 
over the last fifty years in various parts of the world?  The alleged 
perpetrators of these crimes have been forced to face the charges brought 
against them in an international court of law.10  Katanga and Ngudjolo were 
initially jointly accused of three crimes against humanity (murder, sexual 
slavery, and rape) and seven war crimes (using children under the age of 
fifteen to take an active part in hostilities; deliberately directing an attack 
on a civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking 
part in hostilities; willful killing; destruction of property; pillaging; sexual 
slavery and rape).11  However, even though there was sufficient evidence 
and known instances, forced marriage was not charged due to lack of 
international jurisprudence and independent recognition of forced marriage 
as a crime against humanity.12  This is the second International Criminal 
Court (ICC) trial and the first trial at the Court to include charges for 
gender-based crimes.13  While this is certainly not the first instance of 
 
com/download/resource/main/main/idatcs/00010308:0f169b3a522a70b9d8d609a898b7041e
.pdf. 
 5. Press Release, U.N. News Centre, Congolese war crimes suspect turned over to 
International Criminal Court (Oct. 18, 2007), http://www.un.org/apps/news/printnewsAr. 
asp?nid=24325. 
 6. Id. 
 7. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 4, ¶ 65. 
 8. On December 18, 2012, the ICC’s Trial Chamber II acquitted Ngudjolo. See infra 
V.B.2. 
 9. Id.; Open Society Justice Initiative, The Trial of Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Dec. 2012), 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/ngudjolo-judgment-brief-2012121 
7.pdf. 
 10. Press Release, International Criminal Court, Opening of the trial in the case of 
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui on 24 November, 2009 (Nov. 11, 2009), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/press%20 
releases%20(2009)/Pages/pr477.aspx. 
 11.  Id. 
 12. See generally Gender Report Card 2010, supra note 1, at 161, 165, 171, 174. 
 13. Gender Report Card 2010, supra note 1, at 160.  This is the second trial at the Court 
arising out of the DRC Situation.  The first was that of UPC leader Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
(“Lubanga”), who was charged with enlisting child soldiers under the age of to take active 
part in hostilities.  He was the first-ever accused to be convicted by the ICC since its 
inception in 2002 and sentenced to fourteen years imprisonment.  Although Lubanga was 
only charged with one crime, there was a strong push by the Legal Representative for 
Victims to include a charge for gender-based offenses mid-trial but Office of the Prosecutor 
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gender-based crimes committed in the context of either an international or 
non-international armed conflict prosecuted by an international tribunal, the 
significance of this decision rests in the precedent it sets for future 
prosecution of similar crimes at the first-ever permanent international 
criminal court.14  The lack of attention paid to prosecuting the crime of 
forced marriage may be indicative of the Court’s reluctance to address a 
pressing issue due to a lack of consensus and precedent. 
This Note will examine the history of international prosecution of 
sexually-based crimes, discuss the precedents15 set by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Akayesu, Furundžija, and 
Kunarac, and why these decisions have become the legal standard for 
prosecution and conviction of sexual violence crimes in the ICC.  It will 
address the development and establishment of ICTY rules, such as the 
narrow definition of rape as set forth in Furundžija and the inclusion of 
sexual enslavement as a crime under slavery, which has long been 
recognized for its peremptory status, in Kunarac, and why these particular 
rules are necessary for the effective functioning of the ICC.  This Note will 
maintain that the codification of the ICTY and ICTR rules under the ICC’s 
Elements of Crimes was, and continues to be, necessary to promote the 
standardization of prosecution of sexual violence crimes, to provide the 
victims of these atrocities with tangible results and faith in the international 
legal system, and to continue on the path of establishing rape and sexual 
violence as distinct norms of jus cogens.  Specifically, it will apply the 
Elements of Crimes to the sexually based crimes committed in Bogoro on 
February 23, 2003, and that fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC under 
Article 7(1)(g) and Article 8(2)(b)(xxii), and conclude that Katanga should 
be found guilty of his alleged crimes.  This Note will also discuss the crime 
of forced marriage and its recent recognition as an independent crime 
against humanity by the Special Courts of Sierra Leone (SCSL).  It will 
 
chose not to do so.  For in-depth discussion of the Lubanga trial and failure to bring forth 
additional charges see Gender Report Card 2010, supra note 1, at 129; see also K’Shaani O. 
Smith, Note, Prosecutor v. Lubanga: How the International Criminal Court Failed the 
Women and Girls of the Congo, 54 HOW. L.J. 467 (2011).   
 14. See generally James R. McHenry III, Note, The Prosecution of Rape Under 
International Law: Justice That Is Long Overdue, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1269 (2002) 
(discussing the history of sexual violence prosecution and the ICTY decision in Prosecutor 
v. Kunarac where enslavement was broadened to include sexual enslavement as a crime 
against humanity) [hereinafter The Prosecution of Rape].  See also Alex Obote-Odora, Rape 
and Sexual Violence in International Law: ICTR Contribution, 12 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 135 (2005) (discussing the first-ever conviction for rape and sexual violence by 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Prosecutor v. Akayesu). 
 15. Here, and in the remainder of this note, the word “precedent” is used not within its 
normal context of a binding decision.  I use “precedent” to only mean a prior ruling on a 
similar legal issue.  The Rome Statute does not provide for a concept of binding precedent 
as is customary in U.S. law but, instead, sets out a hierarchy of rules and law for the ICC to 
apply when deciding a particular case.  See infra V. 
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discuss the two cases that defined the crime of forced marriage and went on 
to apply the definition but it will also discuss the difficulty in 
differentiating between the elements of sexual slavery and forced marriage 
and in applying them.  This Note will recommend that forced marriage 
should be recognized as a particular crime of sexual slavery due to its 
inherent sexual nature and conclude with the observation that the law will 
likely continue in recognizing and narrowing the definitions of various 
sexual violence crimes, and rape and sexual violence crimes will likely be 
recognized as separate jus cogens norms, in order to vindicate and 
internationally recognize the victims’ suffering. 
Part II of this Note will discuss international criminal law prior to the 
formation of the ad hoc tribunals and the prosecution of sexual violence 
crimes that occurred in that time.  Part III will address the events leading up 
to the necessity for and the emergence of the two notable ad hoc tribunals, 
the ICTY and the ICTR.  It will also discuss the history of the Rwandan 
conflict and the landmark Akayesu decision that first promulgated a 
uniform definition of rape in international criminal law.  Part IV will 
discuss the ICTY, the history of the Balkan conflict, the ICTY’s 
jurisdiction over sexual violence crimes and two important sexual violence 
cases, Furundžija and Kunarac.  Therein will also discuss the two crucial 
rules arising out of the ICTY, a narrower definition of rape and the 
inclusion of sexual enslavement under the peremptory norm of slavery.  
Part V will discuss the establishment of the International Criminal Court as 
the first permanent court dealing with grave prosecutions of criminal law 
and its limited jurisdiction, both in terms of complementarity and 
precedent.  Part V will also discuss the Katanga and Ngudjolo cases in 
greater detail and the ICC’s jurisdiction over sexual violence crimes.  Part 
VI will apply the Elements of Crimes of rape and sexual slavery to the 
pending Katanga case and endorse that the Court find Katanga guilty of the 
crimes allegedly committed at Bogoro.  Part VII will discuss the relative 
newness of defining and prosecuting forced marriage at the SCSL, the two 
leading cases that have defined forced marriage and applied the definition, 
and will recommend that the ICC should adopt forced marriage as a 
particular crime under sexual slavery as opposed to enumerating it as a 
“new” crime of humanity due to the inherent difficulty in separating the 
sexual nature of the crime from the persecutor’s intent to form true marital 
relations.  Part VIII will conclude by addressing that the rules established 
by the ICTY and ICTR have achieved the status of well-recognized 
principles of international criminal law, and in fact have been codified in 
Elements of Crimes, and the crime of forced marriage should be subjected 
to the same treatment due to the need for a standardized prosecutorial 
scheme, recognition of victims rights and experiences, and promulgation of 
the need for rape and sexual violence to become recognized norms of jus 
cogens. 
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II.  INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PROSECUTION OF  
SEXUAL VIOLENCE CRIMES PRIOR TO THE AD HOC 
TRIBUNALS 
International prosecution prior to World War II is both sparse and far-
reaching, generally owing its roots to the “extensive development of the 
international law of war crimes.”16  The movement for prosecution of war 
crimes committed during World War I, and specifically of the Armenian 
genocide committed by the Ottoman Turks, had support among the 
Russian, French, and British forces, not solely to prosecute the offenders on 
an individual basis, but instead, as more of a political statement of 
condemnation.17  The Allied Governments also established a Commission 
on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of 
Penalties where the nonexhaustive list of thirty-two categories of violations 
included, finally, sexual violence crimes.18  The Commission was likely 
influenced by, and attempted to apply, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 
1907, which established a very basic foundation for the prosecution of later 
violations of the laws of humanity.19  However, any real progress and 
further actions were thwarted by in-house bickering and power struggle in 
the postwar environment.20 
International criminal law, as we know it today, has predominantly 
derived from the prosecutions at the Nuremburg and Tokyo war crimes 
trials.  The phrase “crimes against humanity” was first used by the Allied 
prosecutors in the Nuremburg Trials, which was defined by the charter 
establishing the International Military Tribunal.21  The charter, however, 
did not encompass sexual violence crimes.22 
A great step for prosecution of sexual violence crimes came in 1949 
with the conclusion of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, which entered into force on October 21, 
1950.23  The Convention, for the first time ever, asserts that “[w]omen shall 
be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular 
 
 16. Timothy L.H. McCormack, Selective Reaction to Atrocity: War Crimes and the 
Development of International Criminal Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 681, 682 (1997).  See supra 
for an in-depth discussion of development of international law and the post-WWII 
prosecution of violations. 
 17. A joint Declaration to the Ottoman Empire was issued in May 1915 “hold[ing] 
personally responsible for these crimes all members of the Ottoman Government and those 
of their agents who are implicated in such massacres.”  Id. at 700.  
 18. Id. at 701. 
 19. The Prosecution of Rape, supra note 14, at 1276.  
 20. The Prosecution of Rape, supra note 14, at 1276. 
 21. James McHenry, Casenote, Justice for Foca: The International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia’s Prosecution of Rape and Enslavement as Crimes Against Humanity, 10 TULSA 
J. COMP. & INT’L L. 183, 188 (2002) [hereinafter Justice for Foca].  
 22. Id. 
 23. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
Oct. 21, 1950, 75 UNTS 287, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3 
6d2.html. 
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against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.”24  This 
sentence single-handedly established rape in particular, and sexual assault 
through later interpretation, as a crime under international criminal law, as 
both the ICTR and ICTY rely on various articles of the Convention for 
prosecutorial jurisdiction.25 
III.  EMERGENCE OF THE AD HOCS 
The atrocities of the late twentieth century led to the revolutionary 
establishment of the ad hoc tribunals (ad hocs), most notably the ICTR and 
ICTY in 1994 and 1993, respectively.  I will discuss the establishment of 
ICTY and its jurisprudence in detail infra IV.  In both cases, the Tribunals 
were established pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolutions under 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter providing for the handling of “any threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”26  The Security 
Council gave both Tribunals the binding authority to prosecute individuals 
accused of committing grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
violations of the laws or customs of war, genocide, and crimes against 
humanity, “and also authorized that the act of rape could fall under the 
aegis of any of these violations and crimes.”27 
A. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA  
On April 6, 1994, a plane carrying Rwandan President Habyarimana 
was shot down.28  In a country already deeply divided along ethnic lines—
majority Hutu, minority Tutsi—the death of a Hutu president resulted in 
immediate violence.29  The Hutu resentment of the Tutsi because of the 
Belgian historical preference eventually led to a series of riots in 1959 
when more than 20,000 Tutsis were killed and many more sought refuge in 
neighboring countries.30  When the Belgians granted Rwanda independence 
in 1962, the Hutus secured power.31  During the three months following the 
assassination of Habyarimana, over 800,000 Rwandan men, women, and 
children were massacred.32  The Hutu were encouraged by the presidential 
 
 24. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
supra note 23, art. 27. 
 25. See S.C. Res. 955, art. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); Statute of the 
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 
1991, art. 2, U.N. Doc. S/25704, annex (1993).  
 26. U.N. Charter art. 39. 
 27. The Prosecution of Rape, supra note 14, at 1279. 
 28. Genocide in Rwanda, Human Rights Council, http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/ 
genocide/genocidein_rwanda.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2013). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened, BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1288230. 
stm (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).  
 31. Id. 
 32. Obote-Odora, supra note 14, at 139. 
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guard and radio propaganda to murder, mutilate, and loot their Tutsi and 
moderate Hutu neighbors.33  More significantly, Tutsi women were raped 
and sexually violated with the centralized aim at wiping out the entire Tutsi 
population of Rwanda.  Statistical projections estimate that between 
250,000 to 500,000 women were raped based on the number of pregnancies 
that coincided with the three months of the genocide.34  However, it is 
highly likely that these numbers fail to take into account the women who 
were, for any reason, unable to conceive or those who experience multiple 
rapes or gang rapes, and therefore do not represent the total amount.35  
These numbers also fail to take into account the women who were 
mutilated, raped by foreign objects, those who self-aborted or committed 
infanticide, and those who were murdered after they were raped.36  In short, 
“rape was the rule and its absence the exception.”37 
In response to the atrocious acts of violence committed in Rwanda, the 
United Nations Security Council established the International Criminal 
Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994 with a mandate to prosecute rape and 
sexual violence alongside genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes.38  Since its inception, the ICTR has developed extensive 
jurisprudence on prosecution of rape and violence including finding that 
rape and sexual violence were major components of the Rwanda Crisis and 
that they were committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack 
against a targeted group.39  However, the ICTR’s greatest contribution to 
successful prosecution of sexual violence is the decision in Prosecutor v. 
Akayesu. 
B. THE FIRST STEP: AKAYESU 
Jean Paul Akayesu, the bourgermester (mayor) of Taba commune in 
Rwanda, was charged with fifteen counts including rape and sexual 
violence as crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide.40  Even 
though Akayesu has been hailed as a revolutionary moment in the field of 
sexual violence prosecution, surprisingly, the initial indictment did not 
 
 33. Obote-Odora, supra note 14, at 139–40; BBC, supra note 30.  
 34. Obote-Odora, supra note 14, at 141.  
 35. Obote-Odora, supra note 14, at 141. 
 36. Obote-Odora, supra note 14, at 141. 
 37. Obote-Odora, supra note 14, at 141. 
 38. Obote-Odora, supra note 14, at 141. 
 39. Obote-Odora, supra note 14, at 144.  Classification of “widespread and systematic 
attack against a targeted group” is necessary as part of the elements establishing crimes 
against humanity.  International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (2011), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-4757-
ABE7-9CDC7CF02886/283503/RomeStatutEng1.pdf [hereinafter Rome Statute].  
 40. Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-I, Indictment (Jan. 1, 1996), 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Akayesu/judgement/actamond.pdf.  
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include charges of sexual violence.41  In fact, it was only after the 
testimony of Witness J, who testified that her six-year-old daughter had 
been “raped by three Interahamwe [Hutu extremists] when they came to 
kill her father,” that the Tribunal recommended for the prosecutor to 
initiate further investigation into the situation.42  
The Trial Chamber delivered its judgment on September 2, 1998, 
where it finally provided an internationally accepted definition for rape, 
defining it as “a physical invasion of sexual nature, committed on a person 
under circumstances which are coercive.”43  The Trial Chamber also went 
on further to define sexual violence as “any act of a sexual nature which is 
committed on a person under circumstance which are coercive.  Sexual 
violence is not limited to physical invasion of the human body and may 
include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact.”44  
Finally, the case did not allege that Jean Paul Akayesu physically engaged 
in the rape and sexual violence but that he ordered, instigated, or otherwise 
facilitated the acts by his words of encouragement, his presence, and his 
failure to prevent, stop, or punish his subordinates.45  The Chamber 
convicted Akayesu “by virtue of his authority,” of individual criminal 
responsibility for rape and sexual violence.46 
IV.  INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
was created in May 1993 by the U.N. Security Council to prosecute the war 
criminals responsible for the ethnic cleansing campaigns in the former 
Yugoslavia in the late 1980s and 1990s.47  Yugoslavia’s inception post-
World War II inevitably arranged for the resulting ethnic conflicts when 
 
 41. Samantha I. Ryan, Comment, From the Furies of Nanking to the Eumenides of the 
International Criminal Court; The Evolution of Sexual Assaults as International Crimes, 11 
PACE INT’L L. REV. 447, 469 (1999).  
 42. Id. 
 43. Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 688 (Sept. 2, 
1998), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Akayesu/judgement/akay001.pdf. 
 44. Id.  The Trial Chamber cited testimony of Witness KK who described Akayesu 
ordering the undressing of a student in a public courtyard and forcing her to do gymnastics 
as an example of forced nudity constituting sexual violence.  The judgment stated that 
coercion need not be physical and that it may be inherent in armed conflicts or when 
military is present.  The Trial Chamber also broadened the definition of rape to include acts 
involving the insertion of foreign objects and “the use of bodily orifices not considered to be 
intrinsically sexual.”  Id. ¶ 686.  This is significant because it recognizes the reason behind 
raping and sexual violence committed during an armed conflict with genocidal intent—to 
demean and humiliate the “other.”  See also Obote-Odora, supra note 14, at 149 (noting the 
special importance of recognizing rape as only a part of destruction and the subsequent 
psychological damage). 
 45. See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 692-94. 
 46. Obote-Odora, supra note 14, at 150. 
 47. Andrea R. Phelps, Note, Gender-Based War Crimes: Incidence and Effectiveness of 
International Criminal Prosecution, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 499, 504 (2006).  
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Dictator Josip Tito unified the six republics of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro into one communist 
country.48  After Tito’s death in 1980 and just prior to the fall of the Soviet 
Union, Slobodan Milošević emerged out of the power vacuum as the leader 
of the Serbian Communist Party in 1986 on a platform of Serbian 
independence.49  Croatia and Slovenia held elections and declared 
independence in 1991, closely followed by Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, 
leading to an even greater drift between the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats 
dominating the region.50  The ethnic groups within the now-independent 
countries turned on each other and sought alliances with their brethren in 
neighboring countries, engulfing the entire region in an ethnically fueled 
armed conflict.  The Bosnian Serbs initiated attacks against the Croats and 
Muslims of Bosnia and subjected them to military attacks, interrogation, 
and torture.51 Sexual crimes52 were among the most prevalent and included 
rape, forced sterilization, forced pregnancy and childbirth, sexual slavery, 
and other sexual violence offenses.53  ICTY estimates that from 1992 to 
1995, between 20,000 and 50,000 mostly Bosniak woman and girls were 
raped.54  “Rape was an official policy of war” and the perpetrators were 
limited only by their imagination.55 
A. SEXUAL VIOLENCE CRIMES IN ICTY STATUTE 
ICTY Statute Articles 2 through 5 provide for the Tribunals jurisdiction 
in prosecuting “serious violations of international humanitarian law 
 
 48. CENTER FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA CHAPEL HILL, 
What Happened to Yugoslavia? 3 (2004) http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/teachingresource 
s/balkan-crisis.pdf. 
 49. Phelps, supra note 47, at 505.  
 50. CENTER FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES, supra note 48, at 5–6. 
 51. Phelps, supra note 47, at 505.  
 52. Most legal commentary hails the ad hocs with revolutionizing the prosecution of 
sexual violence in the context of female victims and overlooks sexual violence targeting 
male victims.  ICTY’s first case, and the first international war crimes trial since Nuremburg 
and Tokyo, was also the first-ever trial for sexual violence against men.  After a three-year 
trial, the Trial Chamber handed down a guilty verdict.  See Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case 
No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 
1997).  See Dagmar Herzog, Sexual Violence against Men: Torture at Flossenbürg, in 
RAPE: WEAPON OF WAR AND GENOCIDE 29 (Carol Rittner & John K. Roth eds., 2012), for an 
academic discussion of sexual violence against men in the context of conflicts, and 
specifically in the Nazi concentration camps, for scientific, genocidal, and personal 
purposes.  
 53. Phelps, supra note 47, at 505; Crimes of Sexual Violence, ICTY, http://www. 
icty.org/sid/10312 (last visited Oct. 19, 2013). 
 54. Christina M. Morus, War Rape and the Global Condition of Womanhood: Learning 
from the Bosnian War, in RAPE: WEAPON OF WAR AND GENOCIDE 45, 47 (Carol Rittner & 
John K. Roth eds., 2012).  
 55. Phelps, supra note 47, at 505 (internal quotations omitted).  
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committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.”56  While 
only Article 5, “Crimes Against Humanity,” provides for rape as a specific 
crime, both Articles 3, “Violations of the Laws or Customs of War,” and 4, 
“Genocide,” have been interpreted to cover sexual violence offenses.  The 
Appeal Chamber in the Tadić Jurisdiction Decision interpreted Article 3 as 
having “a very broad scope” and covering “any serious violation of a rule 
of customary international humanitarian law entailing, under international 
customary or conventional law, the individual criminal responsibility of the 
person breaching the rule.”57  Furthermore, the Trial Chamber in the 
Furundžija Judgment concurred with the ICTR Akayesu decision 
categorizing rape as a crime of genocide, where the other elements are 
present as well.58 
B. DEFINING MOMENTS: FURUNDŽIJA AND KUNARAC 
In April 1993, Anto Furundžija served as a local commander of a 
special unit of Croatian forces known as the “Jokers.”59  His team was 
tasked with interrogating two witnesses, Witness A (a Muslim woman) and 
Witness D (a Croatian soldier).60  By the time Furundžija and his team were 
through with Witness A, she had been subject to multiple rapes, sexual 
assaults, and physical abuse.61  Ultimately, the Tribunal found Furundžija 
guilty of violation of the laws or customs of war, torture and outrages upon 
personal dignity, including rape.62  However, the Judgment’s most crucial 
component was its narrow definition of rape under international law, 
wherein the elements of rape were defined as: “(1) sexual penetration, 
however slight, of the vagina, anus, or mouth of the victim by the penis or 
the vagina or anus of the victim by an object used by the perpetrator, and 2) 
by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third party.”63 
In a 1996 indictment, the ICTY named Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir 
Kuvač, and Zoran Vuković, in addition to several other codefendants, in an 
 
 56. Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
UNITED NATIONS (Sept. 2009), http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute 
_sept09_en.pdf. 
 57. Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 131 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998). 
 58. Id. ¶ 172. 
 59. Chad G. Marzen, The Furundžija Judgment and Its Continued Vitality in 
International Law, 3 CREIGHTON L. REV. 505, 507 (2010).  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. at 508. In addition to being present and overseeing the interrogation, Furundžija 
also directly took part in the interrogation of Witness A. While he questioned the woman, 
another soldier “rubbed his knife against Witness A’s inner thigh and lower stomach and 
threatened to put his knife inside Witness A’s vagina should she not tell the truth.” Witness 
A was also forced to perform oral sex, raped on numerous occasions, and eventually 
collapsed of exhaustion. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 38. 
 62. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, part IX.  
 63. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 185. 
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indictment stemming from actions occurring in Foca in 1992.64  All three 
were charged with rape, in addition to other individual offenses.65  The 
incident took place during and after a Bosnian Serb takeover of the town, 
after which all the Croats and Muslims were rounded up, separated, and 
imprisoned in various detention facilities.66  All three were accused of 
personally partaking in raping and sexually assaulting Muslim women and 
girls.67  On February 22, 2001, the Trial Chamber announced its conviction 
of all three men of both war crimes and crimes against humanity.68  It is 
important to note that the Chamber also ruled that the rapes in Foca 
constituted an outrage upon personal dignity under Article 3(c) of the 
Geneva Conventions, even though the Conventions do not explicitly hold 
jurisdiction over rape crimes.69  The Chamber believed that the crimes 
committed at Foca were of such a grave nature that they could constitute a 
war crime as contemplated by the Conventions’ drafters.70  Furthermore, 
the Chamber relied on an extensive history of enslavement as part of 
international human rights and humanitarian law in finding that a particular 
type of enslavement (i.e., sexual enslavement) constituted a crime against 
humanity.71 
Akayesu, Furundžija, and Kunarac established solid rules pertaining to 
recognition and prosecution of sexual violence crimes by frankly 
acknowledging sexual violence crimes as significant components of 
international and non-international armed conflicts and by defining the 
exact nature of the crimes.  These established rules have never been 
disputed or overruled by any international judicial or legislative body and, 
in fact, have been used in finding crimes of genocide and torture, well-
established peremptory norms.72  The broad definition of rape and sexual 
violence in Akayesu was fitting considering this was the first occasion that 
an international tribunal of this sort considered specifically proven 
instances of rape and sexual violence.  The particular nature of the conflict 
as well supported a more inclusive definition—the deplorable nature of the 
conflict and the extremely short amount of time it took (100 days) may 
have prompted the ICTR judges to err on the side of over inclusivity.  The 
ICTY took the opportunity to polish and narrow in scope the definition of 
rape in Furundžija while still revolutionizing prosecution of sexual 
 
 64. The Prosecution of Rape, supra note 14, at 1283. 
 65. The Prosecution of Rape, supra note 14, at 1283. 
 66. The Prosecution of Rape, supra note 14, at 1283. 
 67. The Prosecution of Rape, supra note 14, at 1284. 
 68. The Prosecution of Rape, supra note 14, at 1283. 
 69. The Prosecution of Rape, supra note 14, at 1285. 
 70. The Prosecution of Rape, supra note 14, at 1285. 
 71. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, 
Judgment, ¶ 542 (Feb. 22, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/en/kun-tj010222 
e.pdf. 
 72. Patricia Viseur Sellers, Sexual Violence and Peremptory Norms: The Legal Value of 
Rape, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L. L. 287, 295 (2002). 
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violence crimes by recognizing that coercion can exist whether directed 
toward the victim or toward third parties and specifically acknowledging 
oral sexual acts as rape.73  While some may see the narrowing of the 
definition of rape as negative, it in fact makes the definition more explicit, 
which simplifies the process of establishing a uniform definition for 
international bodies, an undoubtedly positive development if the goal is to 
standardize the prosecution of sexual violence crimes.74  Crucially, the 
ICTY also demonstrated the fluid and ever-evolving nature of international 
criminal law where peremptory norms are still subject to novel 
interpretation when it explicitly included sexual enslavement as an 
accepted form of slavery in Kunarac.75  It is undisputed that in adopting 
these particular rules in its Elements of Crimes,76 the ICC relied on well-
established international law arising out of real, fact-based situations and 
any further application of these principles will ground them as customary 
international law and peremptory norms.   
V.  PERMANENT SOLUTION: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT77 
ICTY and ICTR are generally the best known of the ad hoc tribunals 
established by the United Nations.  However, it would be wrong to assume 
that prosecution of the world’s atrocities has stopped there.  The United 
Nations have also subsequently established the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (SCSL), the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,78 
 
 73. Mark Ellis, Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime, 38 CASE W. RES. 
J. INT’L. L. 225, 231 (2006-2007). 
 74. Id.  It also reflects the narrower definition of rape generally accepted within various 
national law systems, like the U.S.  See generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (stating, in 
pertinent part, that “rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished . . . where the person 
is incapable . . . of giving legal consent . . . [and] where it is accomplished against a person’s 
will by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily 
injury on the person or another.”).  
 75. Sellers, supra note 72, at 296. 
 76. International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(g)-1, 2 (2011) available 
at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-A6AD-40EC-AD7B-45BF9DE73D56/0/ 
ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf.  Throughout this note, I will refer to the International Criminal 
Court Elements of Crimes as “Elements of Crimes.” 
 77. It is worth noting that neither the ICC nor the ad hoc tribunals are the first 
international court established by the United Nations. The International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) was established in June 1945 by the Charter of the United Nations as the principal 
international judicial organ.  However, the ICJ is a civil court tasked with resolving legal 
disputes submitted by the Member States and issuing advisory opinions on legal questions 
referred to it by the United Nations.  See generally International Court of Justice, 
http://www.icj-cij.org (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).  
 78. The Special Court of Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia are distinguishable from the ICTY and ICTR since they are not seated in The 
Hague, Netherlands, as most others tribunals are and they place a greater emphasis on 
prosecution of crimes under both international humanitarian law and national law.  See 
generally Special Court for Sierra Leone, http://www.sc-sl.org/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2013); 
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and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon79 amongst numerous ideas for 
others.80  The international community finally realized that crimes based on 
preconceived notions and cultural differences would unfortunately continue 
to occur and establishing isolated, individual tribunals ex post facto with 
limited jurisdiction is simply unfeasible.  Thus, in 1995, the United Nations 
established an ad hoc committee pursuant to the recommendation of the 
International Law Commission to establish an international criminal court, 
and agreed to convene in Rome, Italy, during the summer of 1998.81  The 
result of that convention was a multilateral treaty, the Rome Statute of the 
International Court, which, if ratified by sixty countries, would establish 
the International Criminal Court (ICC).82  As of May 1, 2013, 122 countries 
are considered Member States to the ICC.83  Importantly, the ICC only has 
complementary jurisdiction over its Member States and is often described 
as the “court of last resort” as it will not act if a case is already being 
investigated or prosecuted by a national judicial system unless the State is 
unable or unwilling to genuinely prosecute.84  It is also important to note 
the limitation of ratione temporis—”the Court has jurisdiction only with 
respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of [the Rome] 
Statute” or “[i]f a State [became] a Party to [the Rome] Statute after its 
entry into force, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction only with respect to 
crimes committed after the entry into force of [the Rome] Statute for that 
State,” unless the State voluntarily accepted the Court’s jurisdiction.85 
 
 
 
 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2013).  
 79. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, although seated in The Hague, is further unique in 
that its jurisdiction is limited to Lebanese criminal code; it prosecutes terrorism as a distinct 
crime; it allows full participation by victims in the trial; it also allows trials in absentia; and 
it has created a separate Defence Office as an equal counterpart to the Office of the 
Prosecutor.  See Unique Features, Special Tribunal for Lebanon, http://www.stl-tsl.org/ 
en/about-the-stl/unique-features (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).  
 80. See International Law, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/law (last visited Oct. 
1, 2013).  
 81. G.A. Res. 49/53, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/53 (Feb. 17, 1995); Cheryl K. Moralez, 
Establishing an International Criminal Tribunal: Will It Work?, 4 DEPAUL INT’L L.J. 135, 
140 (2000).  
 82. Rosaria Vigorito, The Evolution and Establishment of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), 30 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 92, 93 (2002).  One hundred twenty countries voted in 
favor and seven voted against (including the United States) with twenty-one abstentions.  
Interestingly, while the United States did sign the Rome Statute on December 31, 2000, it 
has yet to ratify it.  
 83. ICC at a glance, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus 
/icc/about%20the%20court/icc%20at%20a%20glance/Pages/icc%20at%20a%20glance.aspx 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2013).  The United States is not one of the 122 Member States.  
 84. Id.; Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 17(1)(a). 
 85. Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 11. 
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A. ROME STATUTE AND JURISDICTION OVER SEXUAL VIOLENCE CRIMES 
An important aspect of the Rome Statute and a peculiarity of the ICC, 
and international law in general, is the lack of binding legal precedent.  
Article 21 provides for the hierarchy of law and legal principles that the 
Court may apply in handing down its decisions and, specifically, that “[t]he 
Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous 
decisions,” but it does not have to.86  This presents a significant legal 
challenge in the equal application of the law, as it is quite feasible for two 
different Trial Chambers, presiding over different cases with similar legal 
questions, to issue two separate and conflicting judgments.  Furthermore, 
the Court may also apply, after relying on “[the Rome] Statute, Elements of 
Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence, . . . applicable treaties and 
the principles and rules of international law, including the established 
principles of the international law of armed conflict.”87  This language 
allows the ICC to consider judgments of the other ad hocs on factually 
similar cases, as many have been recognized to be “established principles,” 
but, as noted, does not mandate the Court to do so.  These considerations 
potentially present a challenge in specific areas of law that have yet to be 
clearly established and thoroughly analyzed by international tribunals and 
reflects the new-ness and constant evolution of the international criminal 
law.  However, in the limited area of scope addressed in this Note—rape, 
sexual slavery, and sexual violence—the Court has chosen to rely on the 
findings of other notable ad hocs and codify “much of what was first 
articulated [and prosecuted] in the ICTY and ICTR, but not enumerated as 
a crime in their respective Statutes.”88  A notable exception to this 
absorbing of the law is the crime of forced marriage, discussed infra VII.  
The Rome Statute, similar to the statutes of ICTY and ICTR, provides 
for the Court’s jurisdiction over “the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole,” and specifically: the crimes of 
genocide; crimes against humanity; war crimes; and the crime of 
aggression.89  Jurisdiction over crimes of sexual nature can be found within 
crimes against humanity (“rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, 
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual 
violence of comparable gravity”)90 and war crimes (“rape, sexual slavery, 
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy . . . enforced sterilization, or any 
other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the 
Geneva Conventions”).91  
 
 86. Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 21(2) (emphasis added).  
 87. Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 21(1)(a-b). 
 88. Ellis, supra note 73, at 238. 
 89. Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 5. 
 90. Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 7(1)(g). 
 91. Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 8(2)(b)(xxii).  For the purposes of this Note, the 
discussion of the required circumstances for an international or a non-international conflict 
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A crucial aspect of the ICC and its jurisdiction over sexual violence 
crimes is its uniformity.  As mentioned previously in this Note, ICC and its 
jurisdiction arose out of a recognized need for a consistent definition of 
rape and sexual violence and manner of prosecution.  That has been 
combined with the need for a competent international judicial organ that 
would oversee the prosecution of well-established international crimes of 
uniform definition, which was foreseen by the U.N. in the post-WWII 
world.92  The Rome Statue itself recognizes that need and the danger of 
“the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a 
whole [going] unpunished.”93  The ICC and its Elements were the answer.  
As the world conceded its inability to continue responding to crises on a 
case-by-case basis and circled back to the initial discussion of a unified, 
international, controlling judicial organ it was only logical to adopt the 
legal precedents already established by ad hocs created by the United 
Nations for the sole purpose of deciding these very issues.  Even those 
criticizing a unified international criminal court, boasting about its 
downfalls and oversights, and instead proposing a system of regional 
enforcement of international law, admit that “[e]ven a slight variation in 
substantive rules of international criminal law could prove extremely 
damaging.”94  Lacking a consensus, the universal international crimes 
would lose their universality, perpetrators and judges could have their 
choice of applicable law, and “the legitimacy of international criminal law 
could be fundamentally threatened.”95  And while it is true that the various 
ad hocs and regional tribunals have for the most part adhered to the rules 
and standards set out by their counterparts, a universal, singular 
international criminal court codifying those rules as the only valid 
interpretation of international law significantly elevates the validity of the 
new law. 
It is also worth noting that the ICC and codification of the definition of 
rape in the Elements of Crimes, aside from promoting a uniform 
application of law of use to international tribunals, judges, attorneys, and 
perpetrators, also provides a uniform method of relief for the victims.  In a 
world where rape is still often seen as the fault of the woman-victim, where 
even the victims continually blame themselves, “saying ‘I was in the wrong 
place, I should have fought harder, I should have . . . ,’” a written and 
consistent law that acknowledges the helplessness and vulnerability of the 
situation the victim is placed in and that definitively demonstrates that the 
 
has been omitted.  When deciding a case before any of the ad hocs or the ICC, the court 
would first establish the nature of the conflict to determine whether the court possesses 
jurisdiction. 
 92. G.A. Res. 260 (III) B, U.N. Doc. A/RES/260(III) (Jan. 1, 1948). 
 93. Rome Statute, supra note 39, Preamble. 
 94. William W. Burke-White, Regionalization of International Criminal Law 
Enforcement: A Preliminary Exploration, 38 TEX. INTL. L. J. 729, 756 (2003).  
 95. Id. at 757. 
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perpetrator will be prosecuted for his crimes, is of greater importance than 
even to the international prosecutorial system.96  The ICC has been 
revolutionary in recognizing the victims’ suffering and allowing them great 
participation in all stages of the prosecutorial process.97  In fact, the “victim 
standing rule” has been codified in the Rome Statute stating, “[w]here the 
personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court shall permit their 
views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the 
proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court.”98  The ICC allows 
victims to have legal representatives to assist them in the process and to 
participate in the trial on their behalf;99 establishes various protective 
measures during the testimonial and investigative process “to protect the 
safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of 
victims and witnesses;”100 and provides for reparations for victims.101  
These provisions and safeguards are new developments in the area of 
international criminal law and help create “a court where the victims are 
more than mere witnesses,” and provide a forum for victims’ experiences 
to be vindicated while also bringing about justice.102 
By codifying the decisions handed down in ICTY and ICTR in its 
Elements of Crimes, the ICC also promoted the inclusion of rape and 
sexual violence as a norm of jus cogens.  The jus cogens doctrine defines 
peremptory norms from which derogation is not allowed.103  It essentially 
identifies those principles that override others based on certain values and 
interests.104  Article 53 of The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
defines jus cogens:  
“A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a 
peremptory norm of general international law.  For the purposes of 
the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international 
 
 96. Terese Godwin Phelps, Feminist Legal Theory in the Context of International 
Conflict, 39 U. BALT. L.F. 173, 178 (2009). 
 97. At least in comparison with the extent of victim participation in the U.S. “The rule 
stems from the continental European legal systems, which grant victims extensive rights and 
limit the government prosecutor’s ability to control a criminal case.”  Smith, supra note 13, 
at 494. 
 98. Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 68 § 3.  
 99. International Criminal Court, Rules of Evidence and Procedure, III §3 Rule 90–91 
(2011), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/legal%20texts%20and%20tools/ 
official%20journal/Documents/RPE.4th.NG.08Feb1200.pdf [hereinafter Rules of Evidence 
and Procedure]. 
 100. Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 68 § 1; Rules of Evidence and Procedure, supra 
note 99, III §2 Rule 87–88.  
 101. Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 75; Rules of Evidence and Procedure, supra note 
99, III §4.  
 102. Phelps, supra note 47, at 517. 
 103. David S. Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in International Humanitarian Law as a 
Norm of Jus Cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine, 15 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 219, 228 
(2005).  
 104. Id. 
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law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international 
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character.”105  
Jus cogens norms generally develop over time with the consensus of 
the international community and, over the decades of legal development, 
have come to include genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
torture, aggression, piracy, and slavery as accepted peremptory norms.106  
In the ICTY and ICTR cases discussed above, the ad hocs interpreted rape 
and sexual violence as evidence of acts satisfying elements of genocide 
(Akayesu), torture (Furundžija), and slavery (Kunarac).107  Unfortunately, 
the interpretation that rape may constitute conduct sufficient to prove 
elements of other peremptory norms but does not rise on its own rids sexual 
violence of the independent recognition it deserves.108  To achieve the 
status of a peremptory norm, an international rule has to satisfy the basic 
sources of international law including treaty, custom, and general principles 
in addition to other objective indicia promulgated by the International Law 
Commission.109  By codifying rape and sexual violence and enumerating 
the elements of these crimes, and through its status as a “widely endorsed 
multilateral treaty—[the ICC] can be taken to signify customary 
international law with respect to sexual violence as a war crime and crime 
against humanity,” and satisfy the prongs of the first test of jus cogens.110  
Thus, the reasons for the initial necessity for the ICC and the uniform 
definition of rape and sexual violence have largely remained the same and 
continue to be necessary even a decade after the Court’s formation.   
B. THE PROSECUTOR V. GERMAIN KATANGA AND MATHIEU NGUDJOLO 
CHUI 
The Democratic Republic of Congo ratified the Rome Statute in April 
2002.111 In March 2004, the DRC government referred the situation on its 
territory since the Rome Statute’s entry into force in July 2002.112  The 
Prosecutor initiated an investigation in June 2004.113  In July 2007, the Pre-
 
 105. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, G.A. Res. 2166 (XXI), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/2166 (XXI) (May 23, 1969), available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/vclt/ 
vclt.html. 
 106. Mitchell, supra note 103, at 231–232. 
 107. Sellers, supra note 73, at 296.  
 108. Sellers, supra note 73, at 296. 
 109. Mitchell, supra note 103, at 232. 
 110. Mitchell, supra note 103, at 232.  For a further discussion of the second prong of the 
jus cogens test and the status of rape as a norm of jus cogens, see supra.  
 111. Case Information Sheet, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
iccdocs/ PIDS/publications/KatangaChuiEng.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).  
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
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Trial Chamber I issued arrest warrants for Katanga and Ngudjolo and 
issued a decision in March 2008 joining the cases based on “alleged co-
responsibility for the crimes allegedly committed during and in the 
aftermath” of the attack.114  The charges were confirmed in September 
2008.115 Trial Chamber II then granted 366 victims the right to participate 
in the proceedings, represented by the Legal Representatives of the 
Victims.116  The trial commenced on November 24, 2009.117 
1. The Factual Backdrop to Katanga and Ngudjolo 
The atrocities at Bogoro were committed as part of a wider 
international armed conflict arising out of Congo’s deep and difficult 
history of exploitation and greed by outsiders.  In 1871, Henry Morton 
Stanley, a Welsh journalist for the New York Herald, traveled to Africa, 
where he found the “lost” Scottish missionary Dr. David Livingstone, as 
well as the vast natural resources of ivory and, most importantly, rubber.118  
Upon his return to Europe, Stanley became the private emissary for King 
Leopold II of Belgium who laid personal claim to all of Congo.119  Leopold 
was eventually forced to sell his claim to Belgium, which continued to 
administer Congo as a colony and exploit its natural resources until 
1960.120  Soon afterwards, the CIA assassinated Congo’s first 
democratically elected leader, Patrice Lumumba, and Joseph Desiré 
Mobutu, a U.S. ally, became the leader of the newly renamed Zaire.121  
Zaire continued to be quietly ruled and exploited by Mobutu and his 
western allies for more than thirty years until, in 1994, the entire world 
became aware of the civil wars and genocide in the neighboring Rwanda 
and Burundi.122  Zaire was the natural haven for the defeated Rwandan 
Hutus, who fled through the mountains and brought with them “an attitude 
cultivated by Hutu Power propaganda that as a matter of ethnic pride and 
political policy, Tutsi women must be raped.”123  The Rwandan Hutu 
introduced the concept of rape to Mobutu’s regime and the numerous 
 
 114. Case Information Sheet, supra note 111; Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chiu, Case 
No. ICC-01/04-02/07, Decision on the Joinder of the Cases against Germain Katanga and 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chiu, 6 (Mar. 10, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc460177 
.pdf.  
 115. Case Information Sheet, supra note 111. 
 116. Case Information Sheet, supra note 111. 
 117. Case Information Sheet, supra note 111. 
 118. Ann Jones, The Democratic Republic of Congo: Rape, in WAR IS NOT OVER WHEN 
IT’S OVER 131, 131–132 (2010).  
 119. Id. at 131. 
 120. Id. at 132–33.  
 121. Id. at 133.  
 122. Id. at 134.  
 123. Id.  For an overview of the Hutu-Tutsi history and the Rwandan genocide, see 
generally Alexandra A. Miller, Comment, From the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda to the International Criminal Court: Expanding the Definition of Genocide to 
Include Rape, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 349 (2003).  
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guerilla factions keen on overthrowing the ailing kleptocrat.124  But the 
Hutus also continued their war on the refugee Tutsi population in Zaire, 
and the various factions and governments in the region, for one reason or 
another, aligned themselves with either side.  This resulted in what became 
known as “Africa’s World War,” and eventually involved eight African 
nations and about twenty-five armed groups.125  In 1996, Laurent Kabila, a 
longtime Congolese rebel, gained the support of anti-Mobutu Zaire’s Tutsi 
and was able to overthrow Mobutu in what became officially known as the 
First Congo War.126  Kabila then turned on the Tutsis and their allies who 
helped him attain power in the Second Congo War whilst he continued 
exploiting Congo’s resources for personal gain and while his armies 
continued raping for pleasure, need, and degradation.127  In 2006, after the 
2003 peace accords that in reality failed to stop the fighting and raping in 
eastern Congo, Joseph Kabila succeeded his assassinated father in an 
election aimed at merely covering up the instability in the region.128 
2. The Katanga and Ngudjolo Decisions 
Nearly four years after the start of the trial, Trial Chamber II issued a 
decision severing the charges against Katanga and Ngudjolo due to a “legal 
recharacterisation [sic]” of “the mode of liability under which Germain 
Katanga stands charged.”129  On December 18, 2012, the Chamber 
acquitted Ngudjolo finding that it was not proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt that he was the commander of the Lendu combatants at the time of 
the Bogoro attack.130  Importantly, the judges did state, “that this did not 
signify that crimes had not been committed,” and “recognised [sic] that 
Ngudjolo was a chief commander of the FNI,” in March 2003, after the 
February attack.131  Njudgolo was released from custody on December 21, 
 
 124. Jones, supra note 118, at 134.  
 125. Lee Ann De Reus, My Name is Mwamaroyi: Stories of Suffering, Survival, and Hope 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in RAPE: WEAPON OF WAR AND GENOCIDE 139, 144 
(Carol Rittner & John K. Roth eds., 2012).  
 126. Jones, supra note 118, at 134–35.  
 127. Jones, supra note 118, at 135.  
 128. Jones, supra note 118, at 136.  Kabila succeeded his father in 2001, but was formally 
elected in 2006.  See supra. 
 129. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07, Decision on the implementation of Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and 
severing charges against the accused persons, § III (Nov. 21, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1529337.pdf. 
 130. Press Release, Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, First Acquittal by the ICC 
(Dec. 18, 2012) http://www.iccwomen.org/documents/Ngudjolo-Press-Release--final.pdf; 
Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, Judgment pursuant to Article 
74 of the Statute (Dec. 18, 2012) http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1579080.pdf. 
 131.  Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the 
Statute. 
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2012.132  The Office of the Prosecutor has appealed the decision.133  
Judgment in the Katanga case is pending. 
VI.  APPLYING THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMES TO KATANGA 
The Katanga case serves as the first-ever opportunity for the ICC to 
apply the revolutionary rules it has codified since the Court’s inception 
over a decade ago.  However, it is necessary to mention that this lack of 
attention on behalf of the Court toward rape and sexual violence is not due 
to a lack of situations and test cases—the ICC is currently investigating 
eighteen cases in eight separate situations.134  Eleven of the cases include 
charges for rape, sexual violence, and sexual enslavement, three of which, 
not including Katanga and Ngudjolo, stem from the situation in DRC.135  
But Katanga is the only currently pending case with the opportunity to 
finally apply the codified rules arising out of the ICTY and ICTR and 
create a prosecutorial standard for future use.  And although, as mentioned 
above, forced marriage was not charged under “any other form of sexual 
violence” or “other inhumane acts,” as it has been at the SCSL, the ICC 
may still seize sua sponte the opportunity to address and develop its 
jurisprudence on this matter in this case.136 
Over the course of the trial, numerous male and female witnesses have 
testified as to the gender-based crimes occurring during the Bogoro attack, 
in the subsequent days, and as general practice of the two armed groups.137  
Three female witnesses testified specifically to rape—they were gang-
raped by soldiers, and on multiple occasions, brought to a prison camp and 
sexually enslaved as “wives.”138  Male witnesses testified that women were 
abducted, taken hostage, used as sexual slaves, and forced into marriage 
 
 132. Democratic Republic of Congo, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/relate
d%20cases/ICC-01-04-02-12/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).  
 133. Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, Prosecution’s 
Appeal against Trial Chamber II’s “Jugement rendu en application de l’article 74 du Statut” 
(Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1531064.pdf. 
 134. Situations and Cases, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_  
menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2013).  
 135. Democratic Republic of Congo, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/Pages
/situation%20index.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).   
 136. Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 7(1)(g), (e).  
 137. Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, Gender Report Card on International 
Criminal Court 2011, 226 (Nov. 2011), http://www.iccwomen.org/documents/Gender-
Report-Card-on-the-International-Criminal-Court-2011.pdf [hereinafter Gender Report 
Card 2011].  
 138. Gender Report Card 2010, supra note 1, at 165–75.  The ICC, in this instance, 
utilized the application of the word “wife” to show ownership of the victim as opposed to 
the perpetrator’s intent to force a conjugal association with the victim, as the AFRC Appeals 
Chamber did, infra VII.  
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with Ngudjolo’s knowledge and implicit permission.139  A witness also 
testified to a system of mutilating men and women that was used during the 
attack in Bogoro, which included cutting off sexual organs as well as heads 
and opening the victim’s chest.140  However, neither Katanga nor Ngudjolo 
were charged with mutilation. Although these practices were disputed as 
“contrary to the use of the [battle] rituals,” extensive witness testimony 
supports the allegations that these atrocities were nevertheless 
committed.141  
Under both Article 7(1)(g)-1 and Article 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes respectively, elements of rape are: 
1.  The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct 
resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of 
the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal 
or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of 
the body. 
2.  The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or 
coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, 
psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or 
another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, 
or the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving 
genuine consent.142 
This definition is reflective of the spirit of both the ICTR Akayesu and 
the ICTY Furundžija decisions as the definition is narrow and explicit 
enough to establish stable grounds for prosecution but also encompasses 
the broad spirit of Akayesu and allows for flexibility in prosecutorial and 
judicial discretion.  Furthermore, the coercive element is also fairly broad 
and is meant to support the Akayesu court’s supposition that “coercion may 
be inherent in certain circumstances, such as armed conflict,” meaning that 
once the existence of an armed conflict is established, rape and sexual 
violence occurring within that conflict is assumed to be nonconsensual.143  
Furthermore, it is required that the rape, as a crime against humanity, was 
“committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a 
civilian population” and “[t]he perpetrator knew . . . or intended” it as 
such.144  As a war crime “[t]he conduct [must have taken] place in the 
context of and was associated with an international armed conflict” and 
“[t]he perpetrator was aware” of such.145  These requirements also apply to 
 
 139. Gender Report Card 2011, supra note 137, at 226–27.  
 140. Gender Report Card 2011, supra note 137, at 227. 
 141. Gender Report Card 2011, supra note 137, at 227. 
 142. Elements of Crimes, supra note 76, art. 7(1)(g)-1, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1. 
 143. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 688. 
 144. Elements of Crimes, supra note 76, art. 7(1)(g)-1. 
 145. Elements of Crimes, supra note 76, art. 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1. 
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the war crime and crime against humanity of sexual slavery.146  The 
Elements of Crimes expand on the Kunarac decision by specifically 
enumerating sexual slavery as a crime under war crimes and crimes against 
humanity; the Elements define sexual slavery as “[exercising] any or all of 
the powers attaching to the right of ownership over one or more persons, 
such as by purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a person or 
persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty” and 
“[causing] such person or persons to engage in one or more acts of a sexual 
nature.”147  The Elements of Crimes also specifically enumerate sexual 
violence as a crime against humanity and a war crime, a step in the right 
direction for independent recognition of gender-based crimes that neither 
the ICTY nor the ICTR took.148 
In applying the Elements of Crimes to the Bogoro incident and 
Katanga, Trial Chamber II will have to decide whether the crimes were 
committed as part of a widespread or a systematic attack, whether Katanga 
knew or intended it as such, and whether the attack took place in the 
context of and was associated with an international armed conflict, and 
whether Katanga was aware of that.  Based on the country conditions at the 
time of the attack and the widespread conflict between the Hema and the 
Lendu, as well as the participation of numerous neighboring countries in 
the conflict, it is likely that both of the conditions will be met.149  Then, the 
Court will have to conduct a highly fact-specific finding based on witness 
testimony, as to whether Katanga was present at the Bogoro attack and 
whether his actions, based on the applicable mode of liability, rise to the 
conduct enumerated in the Elements.  As the record has been redacted 
extensively for the purpose of witness protection and the cases are highly 
fact-based, it is difficult to conclude with certainty whether Katanga’s 
conduct will give rise to a guilty verdict.  However, it is likely, given 
available testimony that the evidence of rape and sexual slavery during and 
subsequent to the attack at Bogoro will be sufficient and extensive enough 
to find for a guilty verdict.  Whether the Trial Chamber will choose to 
address the issue of forced marriage, under the umbrella of one of the 
crimes already charged, is uncertain but there is sufficient evidence in the 
record to allow such a diversion from the original indictment.  
VII.  FORCED MARRIAGE 
It is important to note that the Trial Chamber does not have the 
opportunity of addressing separately the issue of forced marriage.  Since 
the Rome Statute does not have jurisdiction over the independent crime of 
 
 146. Elements of Crimes, supra note 76, art. 7(1)(g)-2, 8(2)(e)(vi)-2. 
 147. Elements of Crimes, supra note 76, art. 7(1)(g)-2, 8(2)(e)(vi)-2. 
 148. Elements of Crimes, supra note 76, art. 7(1)(g)-6, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-6. 
 149. Trial Background, The Trial of Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 
http://www.katangatrial.org/trial-background (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).  
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forced marriage under either crimes against humanity or war crimes, as 
neither the ICTR nor the ICTY had, and the Office of the Prosecutor chose 
not to charge the crime under either “other form[s] of sexual violence” or 
“other inhumane acts,”150 forced marriage was not charged in the 
indictment against either Katanga or Ngudjolo.  In fact, the only modern 
tribunal that has thus far actively prosecuted and independently addressed 
the issue of forced marriage is the SCSL.151  In 2008, the Appeals Chamber 
recognized forced marriage as a distinct crime falling under “other 
inhumane acts,” as part of crimes against humanity.152  This lack of legal 
attention to forced marriage is not due to the absence of the issue as both 
the cases at ICTR encountered extensive testimony regarding the forced 
taking of “wives”153 and the ICC’s investigation and prosecution in the 
DRC situation established the prevalence of the practice.154  Rather, the 
hesitance to prosecute forced marriage during a conflict (as opposed to 
arranged marriages occurring in the peace time—an important 
distinction155) arises out of the debate whether explicitly enumerating 
forced marriage as a crime against humanity would diminish the gravity of 
the crime by limiting it to a domestic distinction or if such action would 
instead internationally recognize the specific crime the victims endured.156  
In the case of Katanga, the lack of recognition of forced marriage as a 
separate crime against humanity likely does not diminish the seriousness of 
the prosecution and of the recognition of atrocities committed against the 
women and girls at Bogoro and in the Ituri region such that the benefit in 
adoption by the ICC of the standards SCSL has used in its crucial forced 
marriage cases, discussed infra, would outweigh the muddling of the 
 
 150. Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 7(1)(g), (e). 
 151. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) has also begun 
conducting investigations into forced marriage during the Khmer Rouge regime.  See 
Prosecutor v. Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith & Khieu Samphan, Case No. 002/19-09-
2007-ECCC-OCIJ, Order on Request for Investigative Action Concerning Forced Marriages 
and Forced Sexual Relations (Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Dec. 18, 
2009), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/D268_2_EN.pdf. 
 152. Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Judgment, ¶ 202 
(Feb. 22, 2008), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=6xjuPVYy%2fvM%3 
d&tabid=173 [hereinafter AFRC Appeals Judgment]. 
 153. Monika Satya Kalra, Forced Marriage: Rwanda’s Secret Revealed, 7 U.C. DAVIS J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 197, 201 (2001).  
 154. Gender Report Card 2010, supra note 1, at 171, 174; Eva Smets, Justice for “Bush 
Wives”: The ICC and Bosco Ntaganda, HUFF. POST (May 31, 2012, 10:25 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eva-smets/justice-for-bush-wives-congo_b_1534000.html; 
Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges, ¶ 353 (Int’l Crim. Court Pre-Trial Chamber I (Sept. 30, 2008), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc571253.pdf. 
 155. See Jennifer Gong-Gershowitz, Forced Marriage: A “New” Crime Against 
Humanity?, 8 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 53, 34 (2009). 
 156. Compare Valerie Oosterveld, The Gender Jurisprudence of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone: Progress in the Revolutionary United Front Judgments, 44 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 49, 67 (2011) with Gong-Gershowitz, supra note 155, at 3.   
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distinction in the elements between forced marriage and sexual slavery.  
However, this fear of muddling of the elements does not mean that the ICC 
should avoid addressing the issue altogether.  At the very least, in finding 
Katanga guilty of sexual slavery, the Court could identify the specific 
aspects of forced marriage that also constitute sexual slavery, discuss any 
potential differences it recognizes in the practices, and acknowledge that 
such practices have been prevalent in the conflict.  
The SCSL developed its forced marriage jurisprudence in two notable 
cases—Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, also known as the Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) trial, and Prosecutor v. Sesay, 
Kallon and Gbao, known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) case.  
Both cases arose out of the severe sexual violence atrocities committed 
during the decade long civil war between various guerilla factions, often 
supported by neighboring countries, where as many as 257,000 women and 
girls were subject to brutal sexual violence.157  The perpetrators 
indiscriminately gang raped, sexually mutilated and tortured, abducted, 
sexually enslaved, and forcibly “married” women and girls as young as 
ten.158  
In June 2007, the SCSL Trial Chamber II handed down the judgment in 
the AFRC trial concluding that forced marriage failed to qualify as “other 
inhumane acts” under the SCSL Statute due to a lack of “need to create a 
new, distinct category of crime,” and finding that the crime of forced 
marriage was wholly subsumed by the crime against humanity of sexual 
slavery.159  In fact, elements of sexual slavery include exercising “any or all 
of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over one or more persons, 
such as by purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a person or 
persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty,” and 
causing “such person or persons to engage in one or more acts of a sexual 
nature” during the conflict.160  Sufficient testimonial evidence supports the 
conclusion that specifically these actions occurred under the 
characterization of marriage.161  The prosecutor argued that a crime against 
 
 157. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “WE’LL KILL YOU IF YOU CRY”: SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE 
SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT, Vol. 15, No. 1 (A), 25–26 (Jan. 2003), available at http://www. 
hrw.org/reports/2003/sierraleone/sierleon0103.pdf (citing PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
WAR-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN SIERRA LEONE: A POPULATION BASED ASSESSMENT 3–4 
(2002), available at http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/ documents/reports/sexual-
violence-sierra-leone.pdf) [hereinafter WE’LL KILL YOU IF YOU CRY].  For an in-depth 
background discussion of the conflict, see supra at 9–15; see also Gong-Gershowitz, supra 
note 155, at 6–10.  
 158. WE’LL KILL YOU IF YOU CRY, supra note 156, at 28–45.  
 159. Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Trial Chamber II 
Judgment, ¶¶ 703, 711 (June 20, 2007), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket 
=EqikfVSpLWM=&tabid=106 [hereinafter AFRC Trial Judgment]; Statute of the Special 
Court of Sierra Leone, art. 2(i) (Jan. 16, 2002), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx? 
fileticket=uClnd1MJeEw%3d&tabid=176 [hereinafter SCSL Statute].  
 160. AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 159, ¶ 708.  
 161. See generally AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 159, ¶¶ 1080–1188.  
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humanity of forced marriage should be based around the intention by the 
perpetrator to “confer a status of marriage by force or threat of force or 
coercion . . . with the intention of conferring the status of marriage,”162 such 
that “a declarative act alone, if intended to ‘confer a status of marriage,’ 
would constitute a violation of international criminal law.”163  But simply 
using the term “wife” would not satisfy the gravity element adopted by the 
Trial Chamber and such a definition of the crime of forced marriage would 
have to imply acts in addition to those intended to confer marital status.164  
To address this issue, the prosecutor argued that forced marriage possesses 
distinctive features, other than sex, that warrant a separate definition and 
recognition from sexual slavery, namely conjugal duties such as cooking 
and cleaning.165  However, the Trial Chamber notably rejected cooking and 
cleaning as essential characterizations of marriage and instead considered 
those acts further evidence of forced labor thus proving the element of 
control, as was found in the Kunarac decision in ICTY, and similar to the 
use of the word “wife” to demonstrate intent “to exercise ownership over 
the victim.”166 
The Appeals Chamber, in handing down its verdict in February 2008, 
agreed with the prosecution’s argument that forced marriage is not only a 
sexual crime but that the perpetrators intended to impose a “forced conjugal 
association rather than exercise an ownership interest” in the women and 
girls.167  The Appeals Chamber then enumerated distinguishing factors 
differentiating forced marriage and sexual slavery: 1) “perpetrator 
compelling a person by force or threat of force . . . into a forced conjugal 
association with a [sic] another person resulting in great suffering, or 
serious physical or mental injury on the part of the victim,” thereby 2) 
“[implying] a relationship of exclusivity between the husband168 and wife, 
which could lead to disciplinary consequences for breach of this exclusive 
 
 162. AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 159, ¶ 701. 
 163. Gong-Gershowitz, supra note 155, at 22.  
 164. The Trial Chamber adopted additional elements from the Element of Crimes of the 
Rome Statute under “other inhumane acts” including that the “act was of a gravity similar to 
the acts referred to in Article 2(a) to (h) of the [SCSL] statute.”  AFRC Trial Judgment, 
supra note 159, ¶ 698.    
 165. AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 159, ¶ 701. 
 166. AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 159, ¶ 711.  The Trail Chamber also held that 
“other inhumane acts” did not include crimes of sexual nature since Article 2(g) of the 
SCSL Statute already contained the catchall provision of “any other form of sexual 
violence.” SCSL Statute, supra note 159.  
 167. AFRC Appeals Judgment, supra note 152, ¶¶ 189–90.  
 168. The term “husband” is certainly not used in this note in the traditional sense to 
connote a consensual marital relationship but only for the sake of simplicity in the 
discussion.  Both the AFRC Appeals Chamber and the RUF Trial Chamber noted the 
explicit lack of consent in testimonial evidence.  See AFRC Appeals Judgment, supra note 
152, ¶ 190; Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon, and Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 
1185, 1211–12, 1287, 1293 (Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.sc-sl.org/ LinkClick.aspx?fileticket= 
D5HojR8FZS4%3d&tabid=215 [hereinafter RUF Trial Judgment]. 
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arrangement.”169  In attempting to establish the gravity of forced marriage 
as a stand-alone crime against humanity, the Appeals Chamber relied on 
the very same evidence that it had rejected earlier as unnecessary elements 
to forced marriage—evidence of physical and sexual violence—in finding 
that this conduct on behalf of the perpetrator was grave enough considering 
“the atmosphere of violence in which the victims were abducted.”170  The 
Appeals Chamber also relied on the notion of exclusivity to differentiate 
between sexual slavery and forced marriage even though exclusivity may 
also serve as evidence of ownership over the victim supporting the crime of 
sexual slavery.171  Even though the Appeals Chamber attempted to provide 
a basis for providing a new definition for the crime of forced marriage, the 
result created confusion as to what elements constitute the crime and what 
weight should evidence of sexual violence be given, as well as when should 
it be considered.  The Chamber seemed to support the conclusion that 
whether the crime at hand is one of sexual slavery or forced marriage 
turned on the use of the word “wife” and the intent of the perpetrator to 
impose a forced conjugal association.  Regardless of its findings, however, 
the Appeals Chamber declined to enter fresh convictions on this count.172 
The Trial Chamber in the RUF trial was the first to be able to apply the 
confusing jurisprudence stemming from the ARFC case in February 2009 
when it found three former members of the RUF “guilty of two separate 
crimes against humanity, sexual slavery and another inhumane act, based 
on a pattern of conduct that the Trial Chamber broadly characterized as 
forced marriage.”173  The Trial Chamber, as did the ARFC Appeals 
Chamber, used evidence of sexual violence to support findings of both 
sexual slavery and forced marriage thus further clouding the distinction 
between the two crimes without setting our specific elements defining the 
latter.174  Instead, the Trial Chamber explained its understanding of forced 
marriage through specifically enumerated instances: forced into conjugal 
relationships with RUF soldiers, expected to have sexual intercourse175 on 
demand and maintain an exclusive sexual relationship, forced to perform 
 
 169. AFRC Appeals Judgment, supra note 152, ¶ 195.  
 170. AFRC Appeals Judgment, supra note 152, ¶¶ 200–01. 
 171. AFRC Appeals Judgment, supra note 152, ¶ 195.  
 172. AFRC Appeals Judgment, supra note 152, ¶ 202. 
 173. Gong-Gershowitz, supra note 155, at 56 (internal quotation marks omitted); RUF 
Trial Judgment, supra note 168, ¶ 1293.  
 174. RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 168, ¶ 1293–94. 
 175. The Trial Chamber differentiates through its language the sexual violence committed 
against the victims into before and after their “marriages.”  In recalling the testimony of 
witness TF1-314, the Chamber states “that she was raped twice before being married” and 
“[a]s the Commander’s wife . . . was forced to . . . have sexual intercourse with him.”  RUF 
Trial Judgment, supra note 168, ¶ 1460 (internal quotations marks omitted).  The difference 
in language may be the Chamber’s attempt to highlight the apparent nonsexual nature of 
forced marriage, as the AFRC Appeals Chamber decided, and the obviously sexual nature of 
sexual slavery thus attempting to clarify the difference in crimes.  
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domestic chores such as cooking and housework, made to carry the 
husband’s possessions, bear children, and completely acquiesce to the will 
of her husband.176  These specific instances, however, may be and have 
been interpreted by the Trial Chambers as fulfilling the elements of both 
sexual slavery and forced marriage, using “the term ‘wife’ [to] either 
demonstrate the ‘exclusivity’ factor required for forced marriage or to 
demonstrate the ownership factor required for sexual slavery.”177 
The ARFC Appeals Chamber finding of a distinct crime against 
humanity of forced marriage and the RUF Trial Chamber178 applying the 
definition of forced marriage in its trial is a significant step in legally 
recognizing and addressing the prevalent issue of forced marriage in an 
international court of law.  However, the confusing repackaging of the 
same facts to prove similar elements of both crimes may in fact be more 
harmful in the goal of recognizing and prosecuting forced marriage, which 
more often is better described as “sexual slavery plus” and could be better 
used as “evidence of aggravating circumstances warranting an additional 
penalty during the sentencing phase.”179  Although the ARFC Appeals 
Chamber may have been attempting to do for forced marriage what the 
Kunarac decision did for sexual slavery—namely bring it to the forefront 
of international prosecution and establish it as a recognized peremptory 
norm—the definition set forth may have actually set back international 
criminal prosecution by muddling the distinctions between the two crimes 
against humanity.  Instead of trying to enumerate specific elements of 
forced marriage under “other inhumane acts” and having to provide 
evidence of sufficient gravity, it would be better for the ICC, in developing 
its own forced marriage jurisprudence, to accept the sexually based nature 
of forced marriage and explicitly recognize it as a particular form of sexual 
slavery.  In doing so, the victims would be internationally recognized and 
vindicated for the especially egregious crime they were forced to 
experience instead of being hurriedly lumped together in an ambiguously 
defined and overlapping category.  By focusing on the conjugal duties, 
such as cooking and cleaning, and deeming forced marriage a nonsexual 
crime, the ARFC Appeals Chamber directs the focus away from the 
physical and sexual violence committed in the conflict and experienced by 
the victims while the RUF Trial Chamber’s change in language from 
 
 176. RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 168, ¶¶ 460, 1154–55, 1211–13, 1293, 1295, 1413, 
1460, 1472.  
 177. Gong-Gershowitz, supra note 155, at 62.  
 178. Both the prosecution and the defendants appealed the Trial Chamber’s verdict on 
various grounds and the Appeals Chamber dismissed and amended certain counts of the 
indictment but it upheld the counts of sexual slavery and forced marriage, relevant to the 
purposes of this note.  See generally Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon, and Gbao, Case No. 
SCSL-04-15-A, Judgment (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket 
=CGgV JRfNF7M%3d&tabid=218. 
 179. Gong-Gershowitz, supra note 155, at 65. 
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“rape” to “sexual intercourse” diminishes and normalizes the extreme 
sexual violence experienced by the “wives,” neither of which aids in 
recognition and destigmatization of the victims.  Specifically recognizing 
forced marriage as a crime under sexual slavery would allow for the 
specific act to be prosecuted to the full extent of the law with the 
application of the term “wife” not being central to the finding of guilt on a 
particular count but as an aggravating factor used in sentencing once the 
general crime of sexual slavery has been found and as evidence of the 
intent to dominate or control.  In handing down the verdict in Katanga, the 
ICC could seize upon the opportunity of introducing the crime of forced 
marriage into the Court’s jurisdiction and discussion. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Utilizing the Katanga case as the ICC’s first-ever trial study for 
prosecuting rape and sexual slavery under the finally codified rules arising 
out of the extensive work at the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC will be able to 
establish prosecutorial and judicial procedures for prosecuting similar cases 
in the near future.  Such procedures will not only be useful for the eleven 
upcoming rape, sexual violence, and sexual slavery trials, but also in 
meeting the original need that led to the inclusion of these definitions and 
rules in the ICC in the first place: the creation of a reliable and coherent 
jurisprudence, one that would eventually homogenize prosecution of grave 
international crimes, including sexual violence crimes.  This case is 
multifunctional: by employing these rules and definitions in an actual case, 
the ICC is demonstrating that an internationally accepted definition of rape 
and sexual violence is still necessary and pertinent; by revolutionizing 
victim participation, the ICC is calling greater attention to the needs and 
well-being of the victims, who undeniably benefit from a solid, universal 
legal definition for the crimes committed against them—And by 
acknowledging the prevalence of rape and sexual violence in international 
and non-international armed conflicts, and enumerating the specific crimes 
and their elements, the ICC is endorsing the recognition of rape and sexual 
violence as independent jus cogens norms.  Additionally, the Katanga case 
may also be a suitable platform for the ICC to integrate and develop further 
the SCSL jurisprudence on forced marriage even though the crime was not 
initially charged in the indictment since sufficient testimonial evidence has 
been presented to prove the existence of such practices.  If not, the ICC 
should continue to monitor the progression of prosecution of forced 
marriage through the SCSL and the ECCC tribunals and attempt to develop 
its own forced marriage jurisprudence, which would recognize the sexual 
nature of forced marriage and enumerate it as a particular crime under 
sexual slavery.  Such work by the ICC would enable the development of a 
uniform definition and application of forced marriage thus recognizing the 
atrocities the victims have experienced, similar to the vindication the 
GEKKER FINAL TO PRINT 10.29 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/31/2013  1:12 PM 
Winter 2014]   RAPE, SEXUAL SLAVERY, AND FORCED MARRIAGE 133 
victims are allowed now through the recognition and standardization of 
rape, sexual violence, and sexual slavery under the Rome Statute.  While 
the establishment of these rules reinforces the international cooperation of 
States and helps further develop the relatively new field of international 
criminal law, these rules will ideally eventually fall into disuse, as rape and 
sexual violence would become unthinkable violations of jus cogens norms.  
Likewise, the validation of the victims’ experiences and recognition of the 
atrocities by the international community, especially by States where these 
atrocities are being committed and where the culture continues to blame the 
victims, will hopefully assist in the eventual disuse of these rules as well.  
In the meantime, the codification of the ICTY and ICTR principles 
continues to play a crucial role in the prosecution of rape, sexual slavery, 
and sexual violence at the international criminal level.  
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